Class 2: Causes, Radicalisation, Mobilisation
Causes: Setting the stage for political violence
Opening notes
Presentation groups
Remember: topic to me at least by Week 4
| Date | Presenters | Method |
|---|---|---|
| 4 Dec: | TBD | |
| 11 Dec: | TBD | |
| 18 Dec: | TBD |
| Date | Presenters | Method |
|---|---|---|
| 8 Jan: | TBD | |
| 15 Jan: | TBD | |
| 22 Jan: | TBD | |
| 29 Jan: | TBD |
A causal framework of political violence
- three organising questions
- common problems
- levels of causation
- macro-level
- meso-level
- micro-level
Three organising questions (Crenshaw 1981)
- Terrorist violence communicates a political message; its ends go beyond damaging an enemy’s material resources
. . .
- why does terrorism occur?
- predictive/causal questions
. . .
- how do the processes of terrorism work?
- processual/mechanistic questions
. . .
- what are its social and political effects?
- descriptive and causal questions
Common problems (Crenshaw 1981)
(still applicable to significant portions of political violence and research several decades on…)
. . .
- logical comparability
- specification of the relationship of variables to each other
- rank-ordering of variables in terms of explanatory power
3 levels of causation (Crenshaw 1981)
broad environment/contextual factors (macro-level)
circumstances and actors (meso-level)
psychological variables that encourage or inhibit (micro-level)
- these levels are a useful and widely applicable analytical framework
Context (macro-level): preconditions
Any ideas what is depicted here?
Context (macro-level): preconditions
- preconditions, factors setting stage for terrorism over the long run
- enabling or permissive factors provide opportunities
- e.g., modernisation - Narodnaya Volya: operating in imperial Russia made possible by rail infrastructure
- e.g., urbanisation - 19th century urban development of Paris by Haussman: riots and barricades less feasible, terrorism provides an alternative
- e.g., absence of effective security measures - “necessary”
- situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist campaigns
- grievances: e.g., group-based discrimination, relative deprivation (Revisionist History podcast: ‘Saigon, 1965’)
- lack of opportunity for political participation
- enabling or permissive factors provide opportunities
Context (macro-level): precipitants
- precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism
a common pattern of government actions that act as catalysts for terrorism. Government use of unexpected and unusual force in response to protestor reform attempts often compels terrorist retaliation. (p384)
Examples?
Context (macro-level): precipitants
→
→
→
Context (macro-level): precipitants
- precipitants, specific events that immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism
a common pattern of government actions that act as catalysts for terrorism. Government use of unexpected and unusual force in response to protestor reform attempts often compels terrorist retaliation. (p384)
Examples?
- execution of 1916 Easter Rising heroes in Ireland
- Protestant violence in response to Catholic civil rights movement in northern Ireland
- RAF emerges after 1968 Beno Ohnesorg death by police violence
Circumstances (meso-level) (Crenshaw 1981)
- terrorist behaviour as “rational”
- based on assumption that terrorist organisations have consistent sets of values, beliefs, and images of the environment. Hence, terrorism is seen collectively as a logical means
- variety of goals
- from revolutionary - e.g., new state, new system
- to (essentially) conservative - e.g., preserve social group relations, power arrangements
Circumstances (meso-level): variety of goals (Crenshaw 1981)
- can serve long-term strategy and/or proximate objectives
- gain attention, win support
- disrupt/discredit government/state
- provoke reactions:
- affects public attitudes positively and negatively, creating either sympathy in a potential constituency or fear and hostility in an audience identified as the “enemy.”
- government counteraction
- internal organisation functions: control, discipline, morale-building
- actors’ impatience
Circumstances (meso-level) (Crenshaw 1981)
The observation that terrorism is a weapon of the weak is hackneyed but apt. (p387)
What does this mean? Do you agree?
. . .
- inexpensive, simple
- contrast: James C. Scott’s book (1985), Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance
Psychological (micro-level): common traits (Crenshaw 1981)
two fundamental questions about the psychological basis of terrorism:
- why the individual takes the first step and chooses to engage in terrorism: why join? Does the terrorist possess specific psychological predispositions, identifiable in advance, that suit them for terrorism?
- radicalisation and engagement
. . .
- Why does involvement continue? What are the psychological mechanisms of group interaction?
- persistence or endurance
Psychological (micro-level): common traits (Crenshaw 1981)
- ego-defensive needs
- cognitive processes
- socialisation
. . .
- in interaction with a specific situation
- different acts of terror can carry differences in psychological demands
- extremely discriminate (e.g., assassination) to broadly indiscriminate (recall patterns of violence conceptual framework)
. . .
BUT: avoid stereotyping the terrorist or oversimplifying: No single motivation or personality can be valid for all circumstances
Psychological (micro-level): normality (Crenshaw 1981)
“the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality”
. . .
The West German psychiatrist who conducted a pretrial examination of four members of the RAF concluded that they were “intelligent,” even “humorous,” and showed no symptoms of psychosis or neurosis and “no particular personality type.” (p390)
Psychological (micro-level): difficulties (Crenshaw 1981)
studying individuals engaged in terrorism presents problems:
- preconditions change over time and precipitants are unpredictable
- interviewing terrorists: may discover subsequent rationalisations instead of prior attitudes/motivations
Psychological (micro-level): endurance (Crenshaw 1981)
Within terrorist groups, individual/group dynamics of …
- commitment,
- risk,
- solidarity,
- loyalty,
- guilt,
- revenge,
- isolation
discourage a change in behaviour (and at the organisational level, strategy)—even when contextual conditions change.
Politically violent groups connected to Germany
- roster of organisations
- discussion of causes
(In)famous PV groups in or connected to Germany
“Those who only know one country, know no country” - Seymour Martin Lipset (inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville)
- well-known and covered in research literature
- diverse strategies, objectives, and ideological characteristics
- active in Germany and/or banned by Germany (or EU)
(In)famous PV groups in or connected to Germany
Antifaschistische Aktion (Antifa, Germany and elsewhere),
Blood and Honour (B&H, transnational),
Grey Wolves (Turkey, but also transnational),
Hammerskins (transnational),
Hezbollah (Lebanon, but also transnational),
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT, transnational),
Islamic State (IS, transnational),
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (‘Communist Party of Germany,’ KPD, Germany),
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, Sri Lanka),
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (‘National Democratic Party of Germany,’ NPD, Germany),
National Socialist Underground (NSU, Germany),
Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (‘Kurdistan Workers’ Party,’ PKK, Turkey, Syria and several other countries including Germany),
Rote Armee Fraktion (‘Red Army Fraction,’ RAF, Germany),
Sozialistische Reichspartei (‘Socialist Reich Party,’ SRP, Germany),
Die Rechte (‘The Right’, Germany)
Antifa
- Territory of action: international
- Organisational structure: network
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: oppose fascist forces
- (common) Targets: political opponents
- Repertoire of actions: low-level violence, property damage, doxxing
Blood & Honour
- Territory of action: international (originally U.K.)
- Organisational structure: network
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: white ethnostate
- (common) Targets: political and ethnic opponents
- Repertoire of actions: low-level violence, terrorism
Grey Wolves
- Territory of action: international (originally Turkish)
- Organisational structure: hierarchical
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: promote Turkish nationalism
- (common) Targets: political opponents
- Repertoire of actions: low-level violence
Hammerskins
- Territory of action: international (originally U.S.)
- Organisational structure: network
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: white ethnostate
- (common) Targets: political and ethnic opponents
- Repertoire of actions: low-level violence, terrorism
Hezbollah
- Territory of action: Lebanon, but also transnational
- Organisational structure: hierarchical
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: Islamic state in Lebanon
- (common) Targets: Western forces, the power-sharing in Lebanon
- Repertoire of actions: terrorism
Hizb ut-Tahrir
- Territory of action: international
- Organisational structure: network
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: united Islamic caliphate
- (common) Targets: political and ethnic opponents
- Repertoire of actions: low-level violence, incitement to violence, terrorism
Islamic State
- Territory of action: international
- Organisational structure: network
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: Islamic caliphate
- (common) Targets: political, ethnic, religious opponents
- Repertoire of actions: terrorism, militarised combat
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD)
- Territory of action: Germany, but with important international links
- Organisational structure: hierarchical
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: communist/socialist revolution
- (common) Targets: political opponents
- Repertoire of actions: low-level violence and agitation for revolution
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
- Territory of action: Sri Lanka, but also transnational
- Organisational structure: hierarchical
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: independent Tamil state
- (common) Targets: Sinhalese dominated Sri Lankan state
- Repertoire of actions: assassination, guerrilla activity
National Socialist Underground
- Territory of action: Germany
- Organisational structure: network
- Membership: small
- (main) Objective: terrorise non-ethnic Germans
- (common) Targets: non-ethnic Germans
- Repertoire of actions: murder, robbery
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)
- Territory of action: Germany
- Organisational structure: hierarchical
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: German ethno-state
- (common) Targets: political and ethnic opponents
- Repertoire of actions: low-level violence, support for terrorism
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane
- Territory of action: prominently Turkey, but international advocates
- Organisational structure:
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: Kurdish statehood
- (common) Targets: Turkish military and state
- Repertoire of actions: guerrilla activity
Rote Armee Fraktion
- Territory of action: Germany
- Organisational structure: network
- Membership: small
- (main) Objective: revolutionary state
- (common) Targets: German state, right-wing figures
- Repertoire of actions: kidnapping, robbery, bombing, assassination
Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP)
- Territory of action: Germany
- Organisational structure: hierarchical
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: revive national socialist movement
- (common) Targets: political opponents
- Repertoire of actions: low-level violence, support for state violence
Other PV groups that will crop up in readings
al-Qaeda
- Territory of action: international
- Organisational structure: (hierarchical) network
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: global Islamic caliphate
- (common) Targets: U.S. and Western institutions and societies
- Repertoire of actions: terrorism
Brigate Rosse
- Territory of action: Italy
- Organisational structure:
- Membership: small
- (main) Objective: revolutionary state
- (common) Targets: Italian state institutions and NATO
- Repertoire of actions: robberies, kidnapping, low-level violence
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, ‘Basque Homeland and Liberty’)
- Territory of action: Basque country
- Organisational structure: hierarchical
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: leftist revolution, independent state
- (common) Targets: state institutions
- Repertoire of actions: kidnapping, terrorism
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
- Territory of action: Colombia
- Organisational structure: hierarchical
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: leftist revolution
- (common) Targets: state institutions, other paramilitaries
- Repertoire of actions: kidnapping, terrorism, drug trade
Irish Republican Army
- Territory of action: British Isles
- Organisational structure: hierarchical
- Membership: large
- (main) Objective: united, independent Ireland
- (common) Targets: British military and institutions
- Repertoire of actions: terrorism
Testing: determinants of right-wing terrorism in the U.S.
- Piazza (2017)
- theorising and testing causes
Piazza (2017) - testing causes
- Three groups of motivations (p. 54)
- economic hardships and grievances (mechanism: drive resentment and support for terrorism)
- greater inclusion and empowerment of women and racial minorities (mechanism: perceived threat to privilege)
- resentment toward the U.S. political system and government (mechanism: necessitates ‘resistance against tyranny’)
Lays out differing theoretical/empirical contentions/findings about these motivations—and sets out to resolve them (theory-based and empirics-based puzzles) (Day and Koivu 2019)
Piazza (2017) - research design
the study uses a cross-sectional panel time series design to examine the predictive quality of a series of state and national-level economic, social and political indicators on counts of domestic terrorist attacks launched by right-wing terrorist movements and individuals in the 50 US states for the period 1970–2011.
. . .
Let’s break this down:
Piazza (2017) - research design
the study uses a cross-sectional panel time series design to examine the predictive quality of a series of state and national-level economic, social and political indicators on counts of domestic terrorist attacks launched by right-wing terrorist movements and individuals in the 50 US states for the period 1970–2011
- ‘cross-sectional panel time series’ = different clusters of units of analysis over time
- ‘in the 50 US states for the period 1970–2011’ = state-year is the unit of analysis (see Note 14)
- ‘predictive quality’ = research objective, predict (rather than ‘describe’ or ‘explain’), here meaning inferential statistics
- ‘series of state and national-level economic, social and political indicators’ = the (groups of) independent variables (IVs), corresponding to the 3 groups of motivations
- ‘counts of domestic terrorist attacks launched by right-wing terrorist movements and individuals’ = dependent variable (DV)
Piazza (2017) - research design
| Variable group | Indicators |
|---|---|
| Economic grievance | Per cent in poverty |
| Per cent employed in manufacturing | |
| Number of individual farms in state | |
| Societal changes | Rate of abortion |
| Per cent of labour force that is female | |
| Change in non-white state population | |
| ‘Big government’ | measure of Democrat party dominance |
| U.S. President a Democrat in given year | |
| Average income tax rate |
Reading a regression table
Remember: regression is a tool for understanding a phenomenon as a linear function (generally) → (y = mx + b)
Numbers not in parentheses next to a variable: regression coefficient: expected change in DV for a one-unit increase in IV. NB: ositive or negative relationship?
Numbers inside parentheses next to a variable: standard error: estimate of the standard deviation of the coefficient
Asterisks/‘stars’: statistical significance: probability of results as extreme as observed result, under the assumption that the null hypothesis is correct. Smaller p-value means such an observation would be less likely under null hypothesis; hence, significance. Statistical significance suggests more precise estimates—NOT necessarily that one IV is more important than another.
Piazza (2017) - abridged regression table
Piazza (2017) - findings (interpetting reg. table)
- right-wing terrorism not rooted in economic grievances, economic stress, or structural economic change
- ‘gendered’ dimension to right-wing extremist activity: where women are becoming more empowered, right-wing terrorism is more frequent
- predictors associated with women’s rights significantly boost the incidence of right-wing terrorism
- “On average, increases in state-level abortion rates or women’s participation in the workforce produce fewer than 0.05 more right-wing terrorist attacks per state per year.”
- of ‘big gov.’ motivations, only the dummy variable for a Democrat U.S. President is significant
- suggests only peak-level and highly visible political predictors are associated with increased incidence of right-wing terrorism
Piazza (2017) - conclusions
economic factors are not reliable predictors of terrorist activity
social factors help drive right-wing terrorism. (‘ills afflicting “traditional” American society’)
partisan control over government matters at the national level, but not the state level, in determining right-wing terrorism
Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?
Anonymous feedback here: https://forms.gle/NfF1pCfYMbkAT3WP6
Alternatively, please send me an email: m.zeller@lmu.de